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1 Introduction
Climate change is a collective action problem. It is the result of an infinite number
of individual and collective human actions and it can only be addressed by the
concerted efforts of governments, organisations and individuals across the globe.
The projected consequences of climate change will—and to some extent already
do—have a negative impact on human wellbeing and the natural environment. It is
widely agreed that climate change is an ethical problem. Climate change harms
people, making current and future generations worse off than they could have been.
One of the required responses to climate change is mitigation: this includes
taking measures to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 !C. And one of the key
aspects of mitigation is the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
There is general consensus that states should be the main drivers of climate
change mitigation and governments around the world should cooperate with one
another in order to achieve the required reduction in GHG emissions, stop defor-
estation, etc. It is also widely acknowledged that the world is not currently on track
to reducing its emissions enough to have a significant chance of limiting global
warming to 2 !C and that mitigation efforts must go beyond current pledges (UNEP
2015).
In the light of the urgency of the problem and the fact that aggregate action—the
sum of many individual actions—can actually make a significant difference to the
problem (Dietz et al. 2009) voluntary efforts by agents other than state governments
are clearly desirable and arguably morally mandatory. That is, such agents may
well be morally required to do more than what the law demands of them.
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Elsewhere, I have argued that individual agents have an obligation to reduce
their carbon footprint (Schwenkenbecher 2014). In this chapter, I argue that we
have even more reason to ascribe obligations to reduce GHG emissions to business
firms and corporations (in the following called ‘businesses’ or ‘firms’).
To many people it is intuitively plausible to suggest that businesses have such
obligations, others would reject this idea. This chapter will address three potential
counter-arguments against the view that business firms have such obligations:
(i) the view that firms are not moral agents and as such cannot hold moral
obligations; (ii) the view that their principal obligation is towards their shareholders
or owners; and (iii) the view that they cannot have such obligations since no
individual business’s actions would make a significant difference to global
warming.
One underlying assumption of this investigation is that businesses as entities are
distinct from the individual agents composing them. In other words, a business firm
is something over and above the individual(s) composing it. As such, if an organi-
sation can be shown to have moral agency then it can have moral obligations qua
organisation. The individuals composing the organisation then have—different—
moral obligations qua being members of that organisation.
Further, the relative strength of these obligations would depend on agents’
capacities to discharge them and arguably on their direct or indirect causal contri-
butions to the harm that is climate change as well as their relative ability to make a
positive impact on mitigation. This chapter will first address the larger question of
whether or not businesses are appropriate addressees of such obligations per se, and
then turn to the question of differentiated responsibilities.
Another underlying assumption is that swift action is not only necessary in order
to limit global warming and climatic change, but morally crucial. The moral
obligations identified in this article should be understood as pro tanto obligations,
that is, obligations that can be overridden and outweighed by other relevant moral
obligations. Furthermore, while climate change mitigation encompasses a range of
actions and measures, the focus of this discussion will be on reducing GHG only.
2 Business Firms as Moral Agents
Can business firms and corporations be appropriate addressees of moral obliga-
tions? Or, more generally, can groups with a certain organisational structure be
moral agents?
The following is the most obvious objection to such a view: in order to have
agency, let alone moral agency, an entity must be capable of having intentional
states and only beings with brains and minds are capable of having intentions
proper. Therefore, so the objection goes, in an organised group such as a business
firm, the only agents are individual human beings, even if we tend to ascribe agency
and sometimes moral responsibility, obligations or blame to the group as a whole as
a shorthand.
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Many of those who defend the possibility of group agency would argue that a
group of agents—if it has the right kind of structure—is capable of forming group-
based ‘representational and goal-seeking states’ such as beliefs, desires, judgments
or plans, which play the same role as individual intentions do for individual human
agents. On such functionalist accounts of intentionality, group agents can have
group-level intentions, which, while they may differ from those intentions individ-
ual agents have, play the same functional role as the former.1 Whether they can be
said to have such intentions, according to List and Pettit (2011), depends on
whether they abide by standards of rationality such as consistency and deductive
closure.
It is the fact that functionalists about group intentions largely operate within the
parameters of agency individualism that makes their view particularly attractive
(since it is in keeping with the dominant philosophical approach to agency) and
more so than collectivist views according to which a group can have a mind of its
own quite distinct from the minds of the individuals composing it.
On List and Pettit’s (2006: 87) account, a group agent proper acts or intervenes
in the world on the basis of the representational and goal-seeking states it has
formed, abiding by conditions of rationality “not just accidentally or contingently,
but robustly”. In order to arrive at group judgments, an organization must have a
constitution: “a set of rules, formal or informal for determining how the inputs of
individuals are to be put together to generate group judgments as outputs” (List and
Pettit’s 2006: 89). Groups that lack such a constitution, on this account, cannot form
group judgments and therefore cannot act as a group. Group judgments supervene
on individual judgments: the former are caused by the latter, but are not reducible to
them.2
But even if we grant that groups are agents in a sense that is relevantly similar to
individual agents, what about moral agency? We usually consider only those moral
agents who are capable of acting on the basis of moral principles or moral reasons.
This entails that they are capable of fully understanding moral principles and
reasons. Hence, we generally do not consider young children, demented persons
or animals capable of moral agency, even if we consider them agents.
According to List and Pettit (2011: 158), a group agent is fit to be held
responsible for doing something to the extent that it satisfies these requirements:
1. The group agent faces a normatively significant choice, involving the possibility
of doing something good or bad, right or wrong.
2. The group agent has the understanding and access to evidence required for
making normative judgments about the options.
1List and Pettit write that: “We make no assumptions about the precise physical nature of
intentional states. They may be of a wide variety of kinds. . . . We only require that hey be
configurations of the agent . . . that play the appropriate functional role.” (2011: 21).
2It should perhaps be noted that List and Pettit’s account of group agency is modelled on business
corporations, less so on small firms or family businesses. However, there is no reason why the
latter should not display the same level of group rationality and intentions as a corporation.
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3. The group agent has the control required for choosing between the options.
The first requirement is uncontroversial. Clearly, group agents such as corpora-
tions can and do constantly face morally significant choices. The third requirement
may equally seem uncontroversial—we do usually assume that firms, organiza-
tions, states, etc. are in control of their choices.3 The second requirement, however,
may well seem controversial since it suggests that corporations would ‘understand’
what it means to take one or the other option, and to make morally relevant choices.
Yet, the way in which a group agent understands the moral significance of choices
would be different from how an individual agent understands these. What is meant
here is the following:
Since the members of any group are able to form judgments on normative propositions in
their individual lives, there is no principled reason why they should not be able to propose
such propositions for group consideration and resolution—that is, for inclusion in the
group’s agenda. (List and Pettit 2011: 159)
Since List and Pettit’s account of group agency is ultimately based on an individ-
ualist (though not reductionist) notion of agency and intentionality, it is the group
member’s ability to form an understanding of the moral relevance of options faced
by the group and further their ability to use this understanding as input into the
group’s decision making, which make it possible for the ‘group’ to have an
understanding of normative implications of its decisions and actions. If the group
members are not able to bring normative reasons into the group decision making
process then the group will lack moral understanding and moral agency.
I have mainly relied on List and Pettit’s account of group agency so far.
Therefore, let me briefly point to other scholars defending the view that groups
can be moral agents. Peter French argued as early as 1984 that corporations are
fully-fledged moral persons (French 1984), a view extended by Toni Erskine (2001)
to cover states. Erskine in fact argues that structured group agents “enjoy greater
capacities for deliberation and action than are enjoyed by individuals” (2001: 73).
They can therefore have greater potential to promote social goods or violate moral
constraints than individual agents (ibid.). James Dempsey went even further by
arguing that any ‘morally significant system’, “that is a non-agential system created
by moral agents” can be held morally responsible—not just agents themselves
(Dempsey 2013). It is fair to say that the view that incorporated group agents are
in principle capable of moral agency is increasingly accepted amongst moral
philosophers, while more radical views such as James Dempsey’s are much more
controversial.
3Admittedly, there is some controversy around this issue, but I am not able to discuss it here.
Existing discussions include List, Christian, and Philip Pettit. 2011. Group Agency: The Possibil-
ity, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, chapter
6 and pp. 159–163, “The control desideratum”, Strand, A. (2013). “Group Agency, Responsibility,
and Control.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43(2): 201–224; Szigeti, A. (2014). Collective
Responsibility and Group-Control. Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate. J. Zahle and
F. Collin, Springer: 97–116.
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3 Business Firms’ Obligations to Stakeholders
Even if one accepts the view that business firms can have moral obligations
(or responsibilities—I will use these terms synonymously) as such, it does not
follow that they have obligations to contribute to climate change mitigation beyond
what is legally required of them. Three different views concerning the moral
obligations of business firms to reduce GHG emissions can be distinguished.
The first view is that a business firm’s sole obligation is to its stakeholders and to
increase its profits. Note that this view does not allow for firms to hold obligations
with regard to climate change mitigation, unless these increase the firm’s profit.
Further, on this view it is morally wrong of a firm to dedicate funds towards any
end, which does not increase its profits.4
The second view is that the primary obligation of business firms is to generate a
profit for their owners or shareholders, but that they may have other obligations,
too. While the obligation to increase profits weighs heavier than all other obliga-
tions it may be overridden should various other moral concerns speak against
it. Further, where profits are not significantly affected, business firms have moral
obligations towards people other than their shareholders, namely other stake-
holders, that is, all those affected by the actions of the company: individuals, the
community it is embedded in and society at large. I think it is this second view
which most closely resembles the idea of corporate social responsibility as it is
usually conceived.
The third view is that business firms, like any other moral agent, have a variety of
(pro tanto5) obligations, which need to be balanced against one another depending
on the circumstances. The obligation a business firm has towards its owners or
stakeholders is one consideration amongst many. In particular, the obligation to
make a profit and to further the interests of owners and shareholders cannot override
fundamental normative imperatives. According to philosopher Robert Solomon
(1991: 364), whom I consider to be a proponent of this view, “when the demands
of doing business conflict with morality or wellbeing in society, it is business that
has to yield”.
According to both the second and the third views, business firms can have moral
obligations to contribute to climate change mitigation beyond what is legally
required of them. The difference between the two views is one of degree and I
will not further distinguish between them. Instead, my main concern is to illustrate
what may be wrong with the first view and why we may have good reason to
abandon it. The idea that a business firm’s primary objective is to make a profit and
4Another possible option is the view that different rules apply to business operations than to the
actions of moral agents generally or that ‘ordinary’ ethical rules do not apply to business. For a
rebuttal of this view see Frederick (2014: 193ff).
5An obligation is pro tanto when it delivers a moral reason for a certain cause of action, but not
necessarily conclusive moral reason for that action. A pro tanto obligation is not an ‘all things
considered’ obligation, but one which can be overridden by other concerns.
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its sole obligation is to the owners or shareholders has long been considered by
many to express the dominant understanding of the nature of business operations. It
was prominently expressed by Milton Friedman in his now (in)famous article in
The New York Times “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits” (1970).
According to Solomon, this so-called profit motive is a powerful myth, a useful
fiction, which does “obscure rather than clarify the underlying ethos that makes
business possible” and which is due to a misunderstanding of business activity as
such; “the very idea of ‘the profit motive’ as an end in itself . . . is a serious obstacle
to understanding the rich tapestry of motives and activities that make up the
business world”. Instead, we should think of the social embeddedness of business
operations and think about profits “in larger context of productivity and social
responsibility”. This means that we ought not to single out profits as the central aim
of business activity; “they are not as such the end of goal of business activity”
(1991: 356–357).
Solomon considers atomistic individualism to be a main culprit of such a
reductive notion of firms’ ends: the view that business life consists of mutually
agreed-upon transactions between (isolated) individual citizens. This view is prob-
lematic, since business as a social practice “takes place in a culture with an
established set of procedures and expectations”. According to Solomon, “[b]usiness
life is first of all fundamentally co-operative” and requires shared interests and
mutually agreed-upon rules of conduct; its “purpose is to serve the public” (1991:
358).
Following Solomon’s argument, we can see that, like any other agent, business
firms can only operate within shared social contexts and their actions impact on
those who they share this social world with: individuals, other firms and organisa-
tions, and even states. There is simply no good reason to exempt business firms
from the network of mutual obligations and responsibilities (and privileges or
rights) that connects all moral agents. Except, of course, if we claim that business
firms are not moral agents per se, a view the plausibility of which I hope to have
significantly weakened in the first part of this chapter.
Along similar lines to Solomon, philosopher Robert E. Frederick (2014) argues
that business is not possible without its participants’ general abidance by ‘ordinary’
moral rules. Views such as Friedman’s ignore that the very basis for the success of
business activities is a climate of abidance by general ethical principles:
Business could not operate unless most businesspeople were fair, honest, and trustworthy.
Business transactions could not efficiently occur unless the parties to the transaction could
count on each other to tell the truth, keep commitments and honor contracts. Without a
shared social context of ethical values, assumptions, and understandings, business as we
know it would be impossible (2014: 201).
Business scholar R. Edward Freeman (2014: 185) points out that there has been
significant legal acknowledgement over the last decades of the need to constrain
shareholders’ interests where it comes at the expense of other stakeholders. This
reflects a need to reconceptualize what business firms are, and ask ourselves “(f)or
whose benefit and at whose expense should the firm be managed?”.
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Freeman gives a further important reason for holding firms accountable to
ethical standards: he argues that the kind of view defended by Milton Friedman
relies on the idea of the ‘invisible hand’, the view first expressed by Adam Smith
that no or little government intervention in the conduct of market transactions is
ultimately best for all (Smith 1970 [1776]; Narveson 2003). However, according to
Freeman this has led to ‘tragedy of the commons’ problems—common resources
such as clean air, water and soil are being depleted or deteriorate, because on the
shareholder model no one has responsibility for looking after them. This model
therefore makes all of us worse off. What is needed, among other considerations, is
the adoption of ecological principles that firms must abide by (2014: 189): corpo-
rations ought to be governed “in accordance with the principle of caring for the
earth”.
In sum, there are good reasons to reject the view that business’ sole obligation is
to generate profits for its owners or shareholders6 and to endorse the view according
to which business firms’ are merely one kind of agent in the wider moral
community.
4 Two Challenges
Let us suppose you are in agreement with my argument so far. You agree that
climate change mitigation is morally mandatory and that we ought to collectively
reduce global GHG emissions. You also agree that business firms can be moral
agents that can hold responsibilities and obligations provided they are structured in
the right way. And suppose you are convinced that these obligations extend beyond
the obligations they have towards their shareholders.
You may still be reluctant to accept the view that business firms have mitigation-
related duties for two reasons:
(i) Negative duties only: You may think that business firms can only hold negative
obligations, that is, obligations not to harm, rather than positive obligations to
improve states of affairs that they have not caused.
(ii) No difference-maker: Or you may think that whatever any individual business
does will not make a difference to the desired level of GHG concentration in
the atmosphere. If too few actors (including other businesses) change their
harmful practices and reduce their emissions, an individual firm’s efforts will
be in vain.
I will address both arguments in turn.
6For a different kind of argument against Friedman see Frederick (2014: 196ff).
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4.1 Business Firms Have Negative Duties Only
According to the first objection, business firms and their managers must abide by
only the most fundamental and stringent moral rules, but need not go beyond these.7
In other words, they ought to adhere to so-called negative duties only, but need not
discharge positive duties.
Let me briefly explain the difference between these types of duties. Moral
philosophers generally distinguish between so-called negative and so-called posi-
tive obligations and the latter are often thought to be less stringent and less
demanding than the former.8
Generally speaking, negative duties are duties to refrain from acting in ways that
interfere with others’ rights or are harmful to them. Quintessential negative duties
are the duty to abide by a principle not to kill or physically harm others, not to steal
from others, not to rape them, torture them, etc.
Positive duties usually concern actions (or omissions) that make others better
off, even if we are not responsible for the problem they may face. Typical cases
triggering positive duties are rescue or assistance scenarios; even if we are not
responsible for an elderly gentleman’s fall in the middle of a busy intersection, if we
witness it and are nearby (and if we do not have more weighty competing obliga-
tions) then we are required to assist him. Similarly, we are usually considered to
have positive obligations to assist those struck by natural disaster, who, having lost
their homes and livelihoods, cannot help themselves and rely on donations and
support by others.
According to the first objection, business firms must only abide by principles
such as the harm principle; they must not make others worse off for no good reason.
But they need not make an active effort to effect positive change in the world. In
other words, it is not the duty of companies to make the world a better place, but the
duty of governments and government organisation. On this view, business firms are
different kinds of moral agents than individuals (or states).
7Frederick (2014: 211) thinks that Friedman’s view is motivated by the worry that morality would
demand much more than that from firms. Norman Bowie adheres to the view that businesses have
only minimum moral obligations to avoid harm by adhering to environmental laws. However, he
grants that they also have an obligation not to interfere with the political process of establishing
stringent environmental legislation (Bowie 2014). Morality, Money, and Motor Cars. Business
Ethics: readings and cases in corporate morality. W. M. Hoffman, R. Frederick and M. S.
Schwartz. Chichester, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell: 514–520.
8For instance, William Frankena distinguishes between obligations to inflict no evil or harm,
prevent evil or harm, remove evil and do or promote good (1973: 47), in a descending order of
stringency. It should be noted, however that not all philosophers agree with the moral difference
between negative and positive duties and the lesser stringency of the latter compared to the former
(Frankena, W. K. (1973). Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J, Prentice-Hall.)
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How can we address the first challenge to mitigation-related obligations of
firms? Two lines of rebuttal are possible:
(a) One may doubt whether business firms only have negative duties, or else
(b) One may doubt that mitigation-related duties are in fact positive duties.
As to (a): While I cannot address this point here in any detail, there is no obvious
reason for assuming that business firms are fundamentally different moral agents
from individuals or states - agents, which are generally thought to hold positive
moral duties. In other words, the burden of proof for showing that business firms
cannot hold positive duties would lie with those who make such a claim.
As to (b): Still, we might wonder whether our obligations to reduce GHG
emissions are negative obligations to refrain from harming or positive obligations
(e.g. to assist those in need)? The answer to these questions is less straightforward
than might be thought at first glance.
The first problem for framing mitigation duties as negative duties is that GHG
emissions are not harmful per se. They are harmful in aggregation as opposed to
being intrinsically harmful (that is, harmful by themselves, like actions such as
killing, maiming, etc.) (Lichtenberg 2010; Schwenkenbecher 2014). This means
that no individual agent’s emissions and emission-producing activities are harmful
if taken by themselves. However, philosophers like Derek Parfit (1984: 70–82) have
argued that the effects of individual contributions to aggregate harms, however tiny
or imperceptible in isolation, must not be ignored since together they have the
potential to greatly harm other people (pp.). Parfit (1984: 83) claims that:
[w]e should cease to think that an act cannot be wrong, because of its effects on other
people, if this act makes no one perceptibly worse off. Each of our acts may be very wrong,
because of its effects on other people, even if none of these people could ever notice any of
these effects. Our acts may together make these people very much worse off.
Consequently, the emission-generating actions of individual agents and of individ-
ual business firms may well be considered harmful and are therefore actions in
violation of negative duties. This means that taking action to mitigate climate
change (be it by reducing one’s own carbon footprint or by contributing to miti-
gating measures in other forms) is a way of complying with one’s negative duties,
rather than one’s positive duties. It is a way of preventing or limiting harm.9
Much more could be said at this point about the difference between luxury
emissions and subsistence emissions and the fact that emitting GHG is an inevitable
feature of human existence—something we cannot avoid doing simply by virtue of
being alive. To what extent an agent—collective or individual—is obligated to
contribute to climate change mitigation would also depend greatly on their contri-
bution to the problem (polluter-pays principle) and their ability to affect it (capacity
principle). Further, present agents may need to take up the slack of those individual
9The difficulty, of course, is that not all GHG emissions, in particular, not all CO2 emissions are
harmful. Plants need CO2 to live. But this should not distract from the fact that CO2 emissions
above certain levels are harmful (see also Shue 2010).
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and collective agents, who through their past actions caused much of the harm in
climate change, but who no longer exist.
However, our concern was merely with the more limited problem of whether or
not mitigation-related duties are negative or positive. I think that the discussion
above shows that we should conceive of them as negative duties. Therefore, even if
firms can only hold negative duties, they may still have obligations to reduce their
GHG emissions. Let me now turn to the second challenge.
4.2 Individual Businesses’ Actions Make No Difference
This is a more general challenge, which affects all moral theories according to
which the consequences of an action are uniquely relevant for the moral rightness
(or wrongness) of that action. It is a particular challenge for defending contributory
obligations to aggregate actions or outcomes where individual contributions make
no discernible difference to the outcome.
Our moral duties are often thought to be limited by the difference principle: One
cannot be morally required to act in a certain way if one’s action is not going to
make a difference. And indeed, moral principles such as themaximising principle of
utility cannot justify obligations to make contributions towards aggregate outcomes
where each individual contribution is inconsequential, at least not while the prin-
ciple of utility is considered an individual action-guiding principle. In other words,
the (individualist) maximising principle of utility seems to entail the difference
principle.
Note that if the difference principle holds, a counter-intuitive result follows: no
individual agent has reason (or a duty) to refrain from their individual contributions
to aggregate harm, but at the same time everyone’s contributing makes all affected
worse off than they could have been. This is the bottom line of what I call collective
moral action problems: while everyone does what is morally required of them all
end up worse off. Importantly, rule consequentialism and non-consequentialist
ethics are largely immune to the problem caused by the difference principle.10
In any case, if a general principle of this kind were adopted, our argument that
individual business firms have an obligation to mitigate climate change may well be
substantially weakened at least for those business firms that could really make no
10Rule consequentialists need not worry about the difference principle because they consider
actions morally wrong or right depending on whether or not they comply with a rule that generates
the best consequences. This means that it is the consequences of general rules rather than of
individual actions that matter; as long as the general rule (if abided by) makes a difference
individual actions need not. Non-consequentialist ethical theories escape the difference-principle
dilemma precisely because they do not consider the consequences of an action uniquely decisive
for its moral rightness or wrongness. Therefore, the fact that an action does not improve
(or worsen) some particular state of affairs is either irrelevant or at least not always decisive,
depending on the theory.
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significant difference on their own. Yet, there would still be a number of large
corporations whose unilateral mitigation efforts may well make a significant dif-
ference to the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere.
But should we accept the difference principle? Clearly, there are many prob-
lems, which we could successfully address collectively (and arguably should
address), even if individually we cannot make a difference towards their solution:
climate change mitigation is one of them, but consider also ethical consumption, or
the problem of anti-microbial resistance (Jacobsen and Dulsrud 2007; Anomaly
2013; Schwenkenbecher 2014; Lawford-Smith 2015).
Since individualist act-utilitarianism runs into this difficulty when it comes to
aggregate harms and other collective action problems, producing highly counter-
intuitive implications, we have good reason to reject it as a plausible moral theory.
This means we have good reasons to reject the difference principle, too.
However, it is not easy to formulate a solid alternative account of moral
obligations in the context of collective endeavours and cooperative action. Here
is a suggestion made by one of the critics of the difference principle and individ-
ualist accounts of moral obligation, Derek Parfit, which runs into the same problem
most accounts of collective obligations face, the problem of group knowledge and
beliefs. What do individual group members need to know and believe in order for
there to be a collective obligation? While I cannot address this issue here in any
detail, I discuss Parfit’s proposal as one of the first that were made to solve
collective moral action problems11:
When (1) the best outcome would be the one in which people are benefited most, and
(2) each of the members of some group could act in a certain way, and
(3) they would benefit these other people if enough of them act in this way, and
(4) they would benefit these people most if they all act in this way, and
(5) each of them both knows these facts and believes that enough of them will act in
this way, then
(6) each of them ought to act in this way. . . . Even if each of them benefits no one, they
together can greatly benefit these other people. (1984: 77, my emphasis)
Parfit’s suggestion is that duties to contribute to cooperative endeavours can
arise even where each contribution makes no difference or benefits no one, to use
his words. Rather, we are obligated to contribute where we know that there is an
existing cooperative or collective endeavour, which will produce the best outcome
out of a range of alternative options. Parfit’s argument can address the issue of free-
riding on an existing collective good: it explains the wrongness of failing to
contribute even if our contribution or lack thereof does not improve or diminish
11See discussions of the knowledge condition and group beliefs in Harbin, A. (2014). “The
Disorientations of Acting against Injustice.” Journal of Social Philosophy 45(2): 162–181,
Tomalty, J. (2014). “The force of the claimability objection to the human right to subsistence.”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(1): 1–17, Doan, M. D. (2016). “Responsibility for Collective
Inaction and the Knowledge Condition.” Social Epistemology 30(5–6): 532–554.
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the good. But it cannot address the problem of individuals’ failure to collectively
establish a good.
The problem is that, according to Parfit’s account, we have obligations to
contribute if we know that enough other people will (condition 5). But the difficulty
lies in motivating obligations to contribute when there is no certainty as to how
others act. Returning to the question of reducing one’s carbon footprint,—as a
matter of fact—we do not know whether enough other people will act in this way. In
fact, we have reason to assume that they will not. We could at this point simply
abandon Parfit’s suggestion and look for other theories. However, instead I propose
to amend his set of conditions.
In principle, there are two potential solutions to the problem that Parfit’s
conditions pose for our argument concerning obligations to mitigate climate
change: a weak and a strong solution. Their availability depends on whether or
not the conditions are necessary or merely sufficient. Let me start with the weak
solution and then move to the strong solution, which contains the indicated amend-
ment of condition (5).
The claim made by Parfit is a conditional claim. If conditions (1–5) apply then
each member of a group has a duty to contribute to the best outcome. If the
conditions are sufficient, rather than necessary, we can argue that even if condition
(5)—the condition that we believe that enough others will act in the required way—
does not obtain, we may still have obligations to act in the way that collectively
produces the best outcome.
Denying the antecedent does not allow us to draw any conclusions concerning
the consequent. That is, we—individual and incorporated agents—cannot conclude
from the fact that not enough other people reduce their carbon footprint that we
have no obligation to reduce ours. In fact, we cannot deduce anything. This is a
weak solution, since it does not establish our stronger claim that agents do have an
obligation to reduce their carbon footprint even in the absence of certainty about
other agents’ behaviour.
However, if Parfit’s conditions are individually necessary (and jointly suffi-
cient)—and that is what I understand them to be—a failure to have the right beliefs
results in a cancellation of the duty to act in a way that is collectively optimal. On
Parfit’s account, then, individual agents would be excused from contributing to
climate change mitigation while there is uncertainty about others’ actions.
But perhaps there is another way of defending our claim that individuals and
businesses alike have obligations to reduce their carbon footprint even under
conditions of uncertainty. One option is to flat out reject the knowledge condition
implied in Parfit’s account. Felix Pinkert (2014: 194), for instance, has argued that
sometimes we can have a joint obligation together with others if it is obvious—or
‘salient’—what needs to be done collectively and individually, regardless of
whether each of us knows if the other(s) contribute(s). This requires there to be
one salient possible collective pattern of actions that would constitute doing what is
morally optimal and every relevant agent believing what is in fact her part to be
her part.
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Another, less radical, option is the following: instead of demanding that indi-
viduals share a belief that others will contribute, we might merely require that each
group member (has reason to) believe that if they themselves contribute enough of
the others are likely to act in the same way. Returning to our example, individual
acts of mitigation may well have no (discernible or morally significant) impact on
the overall concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, but they could well make a
difference to other people’s actions.
Individual business’s carbon footprint reductions are most likely to have an
impact on whether other businesses (and individual agents) reduce their carbon
footprint if those who implement them are well-known public players and share the
information widely. If we follow Parfit, we have an obligation to reduce our carbon
footprint only if we know that enough other people reduce theirs. But we need not
take other agents’ mitigation efforts simply as a given. Not only may our individual
contributory actions well influence their willingness to contribute, we can also
make an effort to directly persuade them to follow our example.
We should therefore amend Parfit’s fifth condition to read:
(5) each of them both knows these facts and believes that enough of them are
likely to act in this way if they themselves do.
That is, if one’s actions are likely to influence the actions of others, then by our
very contribution to solving the collective action dilemma we make it more likely
for them to contribute and more likely for the dilemma to be solved.
Again, the greater an agent’s potential influence on public opinion and other
people’s actions, the greater their reason for contributing to a collective endeavour
even in the absence of any certainty concerning other agents’ contributions. How-
ever, such influence may not simply be a given but can be increased by one’s own
efforts. In other words, there are ways of contributing to the collectively best
outcome that make others’ compliance more likely. If there is nothing that I can
do that makes others more likely to contribute then I may indeed not have an
obligation to contribute to what is collectively best (where it is not cost-neutral), at
least on this account. However, as I indicated above, more radical solutions such as
Pinkert’s have been proposed and it may be that reducing the concentration of GHG
in the atmosphere is just the kind of collective action where both individual
strategies and collective strategy are salient in Pinkert’s sense.
The upshot of the preceding discussion is: If firms can be moral agents they can
have obligations to refrain from causing avoidable emissions, since these constitute
harm. Further, these obligations are not undermined by the fact that individual
firms’ mitigation efforts often make no direct difference to the total GHG concen-
tration in the atmosphere. They can still make a difference to other agents’ actions
depending on how they go about making their own contribution. Further, if we
follow Pinkert, we might reject the idea that individual agents need to know
anything about others’ contributions for there to be a collective obligation on
them: we could say that a collective obligation exists when it is obvious enough
what needs to be done collectively and individually and when this fact itself is
publicly known.
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5 Conclusion
Having argued that business firms and corporations should be considered moral
agents and that their obligations extend beyond duties to shareholders, let me
conclude by returning to discussing the extent of their duties to mitigate climate
change.
Earlier in the text, I left the following question open: how important are a firm’s
obligations towards its shareholders or owners compared to their moral obligations
towards other agents? This question can now be answered: obligations towards
shareholders need not trump negative duties towards all moral agents (though under
some circumstances they may). If one accepts that avoidable emissions constitute
morally wrongful harm then companies can have stringent obligations to cut those,
even at the cost of profit and shareholders’ interests.12 Note, however, that the
preceding discussion establishes pro-tanto, rather than all-out obligations. This
means that business firms can have a duty—in principle—to reduce their carbon
footprint, but for an individual company this duty may be overridden by more
important duties. All-out duties are always sensitive to the specific circumstances
(they are all-things-considered duties).
Many business firms will be able to contribute to the reduction of the business’s
carbon footprint without excessive cost to the business and its shareholders. Busi-
nesses can also encourage their employees and customers to reduce their carbon
footprint or otherwise mitigate climate change. We can think of energy-saving
measures or using renewable energy, promoting the use of public transport for
employees, etc. Studies show how companies are already reducing emissions,
mostly though in reaction to legislative pressure (Okereke 2007; Eberlein and
Matten 2009; Weinhofer and Hoffmann 2010). Øyvind Ihlen (2009) suggests that
there is still a lack of radical rethinking among the world’s 30 largest corporations.
Further, many companies have responded to climate change by trying to undermine
a national and global climate consensus and other evasive strategies in order to
shirk their responsibilities (van den Hove et al. 2002). Clearly, there is a lot of moral
catching up to do.
Let me finish this chapter with a general comment on moral philosophy and
business ethics. Ethics, as the study of our values and rules of conduct, cannot bring
about change in the world all by itself. But it can point to the assumptions
underlying our value-based judgments and expose inconsistencies in our thinking
and acting. It does not ‘invent’ moral rules—morality as norm-based restrictions on
(and guidance of) our (inter-)actions is intrinsic to human nature. Philosophical
reflection examines existing, ideal and possible codes of conduct and may help
12On what are considered avoidable emissions see Shue, H. (2010). Deadly Delays, Saving
Opportunities: Creating a More Dangerous World? Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. S. M.
Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson and H. Shue. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 146–162.
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improve moral thinking. Philosophical ethics forms part of an ongoing public
discourse about how we, individual and collective moral agents and moral patients
ought to live together. It makes perfect sense for this discourse to include business
firms and corporations.
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